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NSA review completed



**Eleventh Report**

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from  
27 April through 3 May 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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DIA Review  
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COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from  
27 April through 3 May 1973)

The Key Points

- No new North Vietnamese infiltrators were detected starting south during the week.
- Heavy North Vietnamese logistic activity continued, however, all along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, in northern South Vietnam, and in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
- Combat activity during the week remained at a low level in both South Vietnam and Laos.

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### The Details

NOTE: This is the eleventh in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-instigated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

#### A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

1. No infiltration groups were detected leaving North Vietnam during the past week. Nine small groups of civilian and military specialists, however, were noted for the first time farther south in the infiltration system in Laos and Cambodia. These groups, probably totalling less than 150 men, left North Vietnam sometime about a month ago.

2. Our total estimate of North Vietnamese personnel who have infiltrated since the ceasefire remains at slightly over 40,000 (some 25,000 of whom were in the pipeline as of 28 January and 15,500 of whom started south from North Vietnam since that date). Virtually all of these 40,000 have now completed their journey south, except for a few stragglers from regular infiltration groups and a number of personnel in small special-purpose groups. (ANNEX II, [ ] contains a more detailed discussion of the information on infiltration which was received during the past week.)


3. Last week we reported tenuous evidence that an NVA regiment which had been operating in Binh Long Province of GVN MR 3 had moved to Hong Ngu District in Kien Phong Province of MR 4. The

headquarters of this regiment has now been positively identified in Cambodia, halfway along the traditional route which other Communist units have followed when moving from MR 3 to MR 4. Other evidence indicates that some elements of the regiment have already been operating in MR 4. This is the first post-ceasefire redeployment of a major Communist unit in the southern half of South Vietnam out of the operational area in which it was located as of 28 January.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and into South Vietnam and Laos

4. There was no slackening in the pace of NVA logistic activity during the reporting period as large numbers of cargo vehicles were observed moving in the Laos Panhandle and northern South Vietnam. Traffic was again very heavy on Route 99, the major north-south road in the central Laos Panhandle, particularly in the area between Muong Nong and Ban Bac. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which are mentioned in this report.) Other roads in the Panhandle were also sustaining substantial levels of vehicle activity. (ANNEX III, [redacted] contains additional evidence of a new Communist "transportation offensive" in southern Laos.) Communist truck traffic in GVN MR 1 continued to be heavy and further hard evidence was received of large NVA ordnance stockpiles in the Laos/South Vietnam border area of MR 1. Heavy NVA resupply activity also continues to be detected in southern North Vietnam where large numbers of cargo trucks have been observed shuttling supplies southward from Dong Hoi toward destinations in Laos and northern South Vietnam.

5. Additional evidence has been received on North Vietnamese efforts to repair and improve several airfields in Laos and northern South Vietnam. The airstrip at Sam Neua in northeastern Laos has already been repaired and has been operational since February. Seventeen kilometers away near Ban Nakay Neua, a new airfield at Muong Nga is approximately 95 percent completed. At Phong Savan on the southeastern edge of the PDJ, runway repair was underway



as of mid-April and by late April 2,300 feet of the strip appeared usable. In south Laos, the old airstrip at Tchepone has been repaired and is also considered usable. In South Vietnam's MR 1, upgrading continues at the Khe Sanh airfield where 3,200 feet of pierced steel planking-type surface has been laid on the newly prepared 4,480 foot runway. Some repair activity has also been noted at Dong Ha, although currently only 1,800 feet of the 3,700 foot planked runway is considered serviceable. In MR 2, the 4,300 foot runway at Dak To has received repairs and is considered usable by light transport aircraft like the AN-2. Although tenuous reports have been received of activity in and around other small airfields and heliports in South Vietnam, no new construction activity on landing surfaces can be validated. There is no evidence that any near-term plans are being made to attempt flights to any facilities other than Khe Sanh and possibly Dong Ha in MR 1. When and if these airfields are used, they will probably be limited to light transport activity in support of VIP movements, both military and civilian, or deliveries of small critical supply items such as electronic components and medicines.

6. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the period. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country.

(a) NVA vehicle activity was observed on routes within South Vietnam during the reporting period as follows.

(1)

- 53 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border (15 eastbound, 13 westbound, 25 parked).

- 32 cargo vehicles were seen on Route 616 southeast of Khe

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Sanh (9 eastbound, 11 westbound, 12 parked).

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(2)

- There were 113 cargo vehicles on Route 608 northwest of Khe Sanh (3 eastbound, 110 parked).

- 63 cargo trucks were detected on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border (19 eastbound, 32 westbound, 12 parked).

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(3)

- 20 cargo vehicles were traveling on Route 1 north of Dong Ha (7 northbound, 5 southbound, 8 parked).

- There were 25 cargo vehicles observed on Route 9 between the Laos/South Vietnam border and the route's intersection with Route 6088 (9 eastbound, 15 westbound, 1 parked).

- 17 cargo trucks were on Route 6089 southeast of Khe Sanh (5 northbound, 12 southbound).

- 37 cargo vehicles were parked on Route 616 south of Khe Sanh.

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(4)

- 20 cargo vehicles were moving south on Route 1 north of Dong Ha.

- 59 cargo trucks were detected on Route 9 from the Laos/South Vietnam border to the route's

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intersection with Route 6088 (8 eastbound, 30 westbound, 21 parked).

- (b) [ ] nine trucks were detected transporting about 30 tons of cargo in the western MR 1/Laos border area. On the next day an NVA storage facility in the area had over 7,500 tons of cargo--primarily ordnance--on hand.

7. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

- (a) On 25 and 26 April, nearly 300 NVA vehicles were active in the tri-border area of the southern Laos Panhandle and northeastern Cambodia. Although no information was available on the type of cargo being carried, most of the vehicles were shuttling cargo eastward into South Vietnam.
- (b) The following vehicle activity was detected on Route 99 during the reporting period:

- (1) [ ] there were 110 NVA cargo trucks traveling on the route between Muong Nong and Ban Bac (30 northbound, 10 southbound, 70 parked). 25X1
- (2) [ ] there were 169 cargo vehicles between Muong Nong and Ban Bac (61 northbound, 46 southbound, 62 parked). 25X1
- (3) [ ] there were 287 cargo trucks between Muong Nong and Ban Bac (153 northbound, 73 southbound, 61 parked). 25X1

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(4) [ ] 65 cargo vehicles were detected traveling the road south of Muong Nong (14 northbound, 36 southbound, 15 parked).

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(5) [ ] there were 85 cargo vehicles observed on the route south of Muong Nong (60 northbound, 23 southbound, 2 parked). 25 of the northbound vehicles were carrying personnel.

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(6) [ ] 223 cargo vehicles were seen on the route segment between Muong Nong and Ban Bac (15 northbound, 67 southbound, 141 parked).

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(c) The following vehicle movements were observed on Route 92 north of Muong Nong.

(1) [ ] 100 cargo vehicles (57 northbound, 8 southbound, 35 parked).

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(2) [ ] 73 cargo vehicles (15 northbound, 16 southbound, 42 parked).

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(3) [ ] 21 cargo trucks (3 northbound, 1 southbound, 17 parked).

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(4) [ ] 34 cargo trucks (13 northbound, 16 southbound, 5 parked).

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(d) [ ] there were 24 cargo trucks on Route 9211 south of Saravane (18 southbound, 6 northbound). There were 46 cargo vehicles on this route on 30 April (9 northbound, 33 southbound, 4 parked) and 18 trucks on 1 May (11 northbound, 7 southbound).

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- (e) [ ] there were 28 cargo trucks detected on Route 9 from the Route 92 intersection east to the Laos/South Vietnam border (8 eastbound, 20 parked). There were 41 cargo vehicles observed on the same segment on 1 May (15 westbound, 26 parked).

8. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies probably destined for South Vietnam and southern Laos.

- (a) During the period 1 through 26 April nearly 2,000 vehicles moved through the area of a major NVA logistic unit south of Dong Hoi. Over half of the vehicles were traveling in a southerly direction.
- (b) On 25 April, over 100 vehicles moving in both directions passed a vehicle checkpoint south of Dong Hoi.
- (c) On 28 and 29 April, over 140 NVA cargo vehicles were observed crossing the Giang River in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle.

C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

9. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (27 Apr-3 May) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire		Last Week (27 Apr-3 May)	
	Level of Action		Level of Action	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	854	2,850	34	92
MR 2	202	1,404	5	88
MR 3	309	1,931	16	88
MR 4	478	4,360	28	313
Totals	1,843	10,545	83 (102) <u>1/</u>	581 (574) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

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10. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

11. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

#### MILITARY REGION 1

- (a) Between 27 April and 4 May, friendly forces in Thua Thien Province continued to receive moderate attacks-by-fire and limited ground probes.
- (b) On 28 and 29 April ranger elements 10 kilometers northwest of Mo Duc received 146 rounds of mortar fire in two attacks-by-fire.

#### MILITARY REGION 2

On 2 May, an ARVN unit 11 kilometers northwest of Bong Son in Binh Dinh Province received a ground attack.

#### MILITARY REGION 3


Between 27 April and 4 May, friendly forces at Tonle Chan continued to receive attacks-by-fire.




## CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


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
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MILITARY REGION 4

- (a) On 26 April, 10 kilometers west of Kien Thien, a PF unit received an attack-by-fire of 123 mixed mortar rounds.
- (b) On 27 April, 6 kilometers north of Hong Nhu, friendly forces received a ground attack.

D. Combat Activity Initiated By Communist Forces  
in Laos During the Week From 27 April to 3 May

12. In north Laos, North Vietnamese Army forces wiped the slate clean in the Tha Vieng sector southeast of the Plain of Jars by dislodging the last remaining government units from the area on 26 and 27 April. All government units formerly committed to the defense of Tha Vieng and Route 4 are now located in or withdrawing toward Muong Decha, a Meo resettlement center 35 kilometers southwest of Tha Vieng. In Military Region 1 of Laos, a Royal Lao Army (FAR) reaction force succeeded in recapturing one of three positions in northwestern Sayaboury Province lost during a coordinated Communist thrust on 20 April, but failed in an attempt to retake a second position. In south Laos, several company-sized engagements occurred in the contested area southeast of Thakhek during the week, and a sharp Communist attack east of Soukhouma in Champassak Province resulted in the government's loss of Ban Bunkeo, a Mekong River Village. Elsewhere in Laos, no significant military activity occurred during the reporting period.

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## ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese  
Personnel to the South

1. A total of nine special-purpose infiltration groups were detected--seven in southern Laos and two in Cambodia--during the reporting period. Five of these groups are destined for the COSVN area, while three are traveling to the B-3 Front and one to an unknown destination. Based on currently estimated travel times, all of these groups probably departed North Vietnam in early April.

2. The following table lists those infiltration groups which were detected for the first time during the past week.



Infiltration Groups Initially Reported  
During the Past Week

<u>Group</u> <u>Designator</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date of</u> <u>Detection</u>
A227	10	South Laos	26 April
A267	14	Cambodia	30 April
A324	7	South Laos	26 April
A325	1	South Laos	26 April
A326	6	South Laos	26 April
QL214	3	South Laos	26 April
QL223	Unk	South Laos	26 April
QL485	Unk	Cambodia	28 April
Y239	55	South Laos	26 April

## ANNEX III

Intercepted communications of 30 April from NVA logistic elements in southern Laos have revealed that a new "general transportation offensive" has been launched there. A total of 1,100 tons of cargo had reportedly already passed through the area en route to NVA forces in the South Vietnamese central highlands. An additional 4,500 tons are slated to arrive in the central highlands and the tri-border area by 20 May. Much of this tonnage is presumably military supplies, since a major NVA unit in the tri-border area has complained that this new transport offensive was interfering with the supply of foodstuffs.

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